Daily Papers

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when individual agents form a coalition and collude to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) and measure collusion via regret relative to the cooperative optimum. Colosseum tests each LLM for collusion under different objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. Through our audit, we show that most out-of-the-box models exhibited a propensity to collude when a secret communication channel was artificially formed. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but would often pick non-collusive actions, thus providing little effect on the joint task. Colosseum provides a new way to study collusion by measuring communications and actions in rich yet verifiable environments.

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human oversight. While linear probes on model activations have shown promise for detecting deception in single-agent settings, collusion is inherently a multi-agent phenomenon, and the use of internal representations for detecting collusion between agents remains unexplored. We introduce NARCBench, a benchmark for evaluating collusion detection under environment distribution shift, and propose five probing techniques that aggregate per-agent deception scores to classify scenarios at the group level. Our probes achieve 1.00 AUROC in-distribution and 0.60--0.86 AUROC when transferred zero-shot to structurally different multi-agent scenarios and a steganographic blackjack card-counting task. We find that no single probing technique dominates across all collusion types, suggesting that different forms of collusion manifest differently in activation space. We also find preliminary evidence that this signal is localised at the token level, with the colluding agent's activations spiking specifically when processing the encoded parts of their partner's message. This work takes a step toward multi-agent interpretability: extending white-box inspection from single models to multi-agent contexts, where detection requires aggregating signals across agents. These results suggest that model internals provide a complementary signal to text-level monitoring for detecting multi-agent collusion, particularly for organisations with access to model activations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/aaronrose227/narcbench.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

Reinforcement learning for code generation relies on verifiable rewards from unit test pass rates. Yet high-quality test suites are scarce, existing datasets offer limited coverage, and static rewards fail to adapt as models improve. Recent self-play methods unify code and test generation in a single model, but face a inherent dilemma: white-box access leads to self-collusion where the model produces trivial tests for easy rewards, yet black-box restriction yields generic tests that miss implementation-specific bugs. We introduce Code-A1, an adversarial co-evolution framework that jointly optimizes a Code LLM and a Test LLM with opposing objectives. The Code LLM is rewarded for passing more tests, while the Test LLM is rewarded for exposing more defects. This architectural separation eliminates self-collusion risks and safely enables white-box test generation, where the Test LLM can inspect candidate code to craft targeted adversarial tests. We further introduce a Mistake Book mechanism for experience replay and a composite reward balancing test validity with adversarial difficulty. Experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder models demonstrate that Code-A1 achieves code generation performance matching or exceeding models trained on human-annotated tests, while significantly improving test generation capability.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

An important function of collaborative network intrusion detection is to analyze the network logs of the collaborators for joint IP addresses. However, sharing IP addresses in plain is sensitive and may be even subject to privacy legislation as it is personally identifiable information. In this paper, we present the privacy-preserving collection of IP addresses. We propose a single collector, over-threshold private set intersection protocol. In this protocol N participants identify the IP addresses that appear in at least t participant's sets without revealing any information about other IP addresses. Using a novel hashing scheme, we reduce the computational complexity of the previous state-of-the-art solution from O(M(N M/t)^{2t}) to O(t^2MN{t}), where M denotes the dataset size. This reduction makes it practically feasible to apply our protocol to real network logs. We test our protocol using joint networks logs of multiple institutions. Additionally, we present two deployment options: a collusion-safe deployment, which provides stronger security guarantees at the cost of increased communication overhead, and a non-interactive deployment, which assumes a non-colluding collector but offers significantly lower communication costs and applicable to many use cases of collaborative network intrusion detection similar to ours.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

The great success of the diffusion model in image synthesis led to the release of gigantic commercial models, raising the issue of copyright protection and inappropriate content generation. Training-free diffusion watermarking provides a low-cost solution for these issues. However, the prior works remain vulnerable to rotation, scaling, and translation (RST) attacks. Although some methods employ meticulously designed patterns to mitigate this issue, they often reduce watermark capacity, which can result in identity (ID) collusion. To address these problems, we propose MaXsive, a training-free diffusion model generative watermarking technique that has high capacity and robustness. MaXsive best utilizes the initial noise to watermark the diffusion model. Moreover, instead of using a meticulously repetitive ring pattern, we propose injecting the X-shape template to recover the RST distortions. This design significantly increases robustness without losing any capacity, making ID collusion less likely to happen. The effectiveness of MaXsive has been verified on two well-known watermarking benchmarks under the scenarios of verification and identification.

Agentic AI marks an important transition from single-step generative models to systems capable of reasoning, planning, acting, and adapting over long-lasting tasks. By integrating memory, tool use, and iterative decision cycles, these systems enable continuous, autonomous workflows in real-world environments. This survey examines the implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity. On the defensive side, agentic capabilities enable continuous monitoring, autonomous incident response, adaptive threat hunting, and fraud detection at scale. Conversely, the same properties amplify adversarial power by accelerating reconnaissance, exploitation, coordination, and social-engineering attacks. These dual-use dynamics expose fundamental gaps in existing governance, assurance, and accountability mechanisms, which were largely designed for non-autonomous and short-lived AI systems. To address these challenges, we survey emerging threat models, security frameworks, and evaluation pipelines tailored to agentic systems, and analyze systemic risks including agent collusion, cascading failures, oversight evasion, and memory poisoning. Finally, we present three representative use-case implementations that illustrate how agentic AI behaves in practical cybersecurity workflows, and how design choices shape reliability, safety, and operational effectiveness.

This paper introduces Federated Retrieval-Augmented Generation (FRAG), a novel database management paradigm tailored for the growing needs of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems, which are increasingly powered by large-language models (LLMs). FRAG enables mutually-distrusted parties to collaboratively perform Approximate k-Nearest Neighbor (ANN) searches on encrypted query vectors and encrypted data stored in distributed vector databases, all while ensuring that no party can gain any knowledge about the queries or data of others. Achieving this paradigm presents two key challenges: (i) ensuring strong security guarantees, such as Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA), under practical assumptions (e.g., we avoid overly optimistic assumptions like non-collusion among parties); and (ii) maintaining performance overheads comparable to traditional, non-federated RAG systems. To address these challenges, FRAG employs a single-key homomorphic encryption protocol that simplifies key management across mutually-distrusted parties. Additionally, FRAG introduces a multiplicative caching technique to efficiently encrypt floating-point numbers, significantly improving computational performance in large-scale federated environments. We provide a rigorous security proof using standard cryptographic reductions and demonstrate the practical scalability and efficiency of FRAG through extensive experiments on both benchmark and real-world datasets.

Federated Learning (FL), a privacy-preserving decentralized machine learning framework, has been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Current research primarily focuses on the Single-Label Backdoor Attack (SBA), wherein adversaries share a consistent target. However, a critical fact is overlooked: adversaries may be non-cooperative, have distinct targets, and operate independently, which exhibits a more practical scenario called Multi-Label Backdoor Attack (MBA). Unfortunately, prior works are ineffective in the MBA scenario since non-cooperative attackers exclude each other. In this work, we conduct an in-depth investigation to uncover the inherent constraints of the exclusion: similar backdoor mappings are constructed for different targets, resulting in conflicts among backdoor functions. To address this limitation, we propose Mirage, the first non-cooperative MBA strategy in FL that allows attackers to inject effective and persistent backdoors into the global model without collusion by constructing in-distribution (ID) backdoor mapping. Specifically, we introduce an adversarial adaptation method to bridge the backdoor features and the target distribution in an ID manner. Additionally, we further leverage a constrained optimization method to ensure the ID mapping survives in the global training dynamics. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that Mirage outperforms various state-of-the-art attacks and bypasses existing defenses, achieving an average ASR greater than 97\% and maintaining over 90\% after 900 rounds. This work aims to alert researchers to this potential threat and inspire the design of effective defense mechanisms. Code has been made open-source.

Advances in large language models have enabled agentic AI systems that can reason, plan, and interact with external tools to execute multi-step workflows, while public blockchains have evolved into a programmable substrate for value transfer, access control, and verifiable state transitions. Their convergence introduces a high-stakes systems challenge: designing standard, interoperable, and secure interfaces that allow agents to observe on-chain state, formulate transaction intents, and authorize execution without exposing users, protocols, or organizations to unacceptable security, governance, or economic risks. This survey systematizes the emerging landscape of agent-blockchain interoperability through a systematic literature review, identifying 317 relevant works from an initial pool of over 3000 records. We contribute a five-part taxonomy of integration patterns spanning read-only analytics, simulation and intent generation, delegated execution, autonomous signing, and multi-agent workflows; a threat model tailored to agent-driven transaction pipelines that captures risks ranging from prompt injection and policy misuse to key compromise, adversarial execution dynamics, and multi-agent collusion; and a comparative capability matrix analyzing more than 20 representative systems across 13 dimensions, including custody models, permissioning, policy enforcement, observability, and recovery. Building on the gaps revealed by this analysis, we outline a research roadmap centered on two interface abstractions: a Transaction Intent Schema for portable and unambiguous goal specification, and a Policy Decision Record for auditable, verifiable policy enforcement across execution environments. We conclude by proposing a reproducible evaluation suite and benchmarks for assessing the safety, reliability, and economic robustness of agent-mediated on-chain execution.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-45^circ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.