Daily Papers

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are inclined explore Small Language Models (SLMs) as edge-native constitutional firewalls to vet proposals and mitigate semantic social engineering. While scaling inference-time compute (System 2) enhances formal logic, its efficacy in highly adversarial, cryptoeconomic governance environments remains underexplored. To address this, we introduce Sentinel-Bench, an 840-inference empirical framework executing a strict intra-model ablation on Qwen-3.5-9B. By toggling latent reasoning across frozen weights, we isolate the impact of inference-time compute against an adversarial Optimism DAO dataset. Our findings reveal a severe compute-accuracy inversion. The autoregressive baseline (System 1) achieved 100% adversarial robustness, 100% juridical consistency, and state finality in under 13 seconds. Conversely, System 2 reasoning introduced catastrophic instability, fundamentally driven by a 26.7% Reasoning Non-Convergence (cognitive collapse) rate. This collapse degraded trial-to-trial consensus stability to 72.6% and imposed a 17x latency overhead, introducing critical vulnerabilities to Governance Extractable Value (GEV) and hardware centralization. While rare (1.5% of adversarial trials), we empirically captured "Reasoning-Induced Sycophancy," where the model generated significantly longer internal monologues (averaging 25,750 characters) to rationalize failing the adversarial trap. We conclude that for edge-native SLMs operating under Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) constraints, System 1 parameterized intuition is structurally and economically superior to System 2 iterative deliberation for decentralized consensus. Code and Dataset: https://github.com/smarizvi110/sentinel-bench

Reinforcement learning algorithms such as GRPO have driven recent advances in large language model (LLM) reasoning. While scaling the number of rollouts stabilizes training, existing approaches suffer from limited exploration on challenging prompts and leave informative feedback signals underexploited, due to context-independent rollout allocation across prompts (e.g., generating 16 rollouts per prompt) and relying heavily on sparse rewards. This paper presents XRPO(eXplore - eXploit GRPO), a unified framework that recasts policy optimization through the principled lens of rollout exploration-exploitation. To enhance exploration, XRPO introduces a mathematically grounded rollout allocator that adaptively prioritizes prompts with higher potential for uncertainty reduction. It further addresses stagnation on zero-reward prompts through an in-context seeding strategy that injects curated exemplars, steering the model into more difficult reasoning trajectories. To strengthen exploitation, XRPO develops a group-relative, novelty-aware advantage sharpening mechanism that leverages sequence likelihoods to amplify low-probability yet correct responses, thereby extending the policy's reach beyond sparse rewards. Experiments across diverse math and coding benchmarks on both reasoning and non-reasoning models demonstrate that XRPO outperforms existing advances (e.g., GRPO and GSPO) up to 4% pass@1 and 6% cons@32, while accelerating training convergence by up to 2.7X.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

We introduce a unified framework for iterative reasoning that leverages non-Euclidean geometry via Bregman divergences, higher-order operator averaging, and adaptive feedback mechanisms. Our analysis establishes that, under mild smoothness and contractivity assumptions, a generalized update scheme not only unifies classical methods such as mirror descent and dynamic programming but also captures modern chain-of-thought reasoning processes in large language models. In particular, we prove that our accelerated iterative update achieves an O(1/t^2) convergence rate in the absence of persistent perturbations, and we further demonstrate that feedback (iterative) architectures are necessary to approximate certain fixed-point functions efficiently. These theoretical insights bridge classical acceleration techniques with contemporary applications in neural computation and optimization.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

In recent years, reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a popular approach for solving sequence-based tasks in machine learning. However, finding suitable alternatives to RL remains an exciting and innovative research area. One such alternative that has garnered attention is the Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System (NARS), which is a general-purpose cognitive reasoning framework. In this paper, we delve into the potential of NARS as a substitute for RL in solving sequence-based tasks. To investigate this, we conduct a comparative analysis of the performance of ONA as an implementation of NARS and Q-Learning in various environments that were created using the Open AI gym. The environments have different difficulty levels, ranging from simple to complex. Our results demonstrate that NARS is a promising alternative to RL, with competitive performance in diverse environments, particularly in non-deterministic ones.

What is reasoning? This question has driven centuries of philosophical inquiry, from Aristotle's syllogisms to modern computational complexity theory. In the age of large language models achieving superhuman performance on benchmarks like GSM8K (95\% accuracy) and HumanEval (90\% pass@1), we must ask: have these systems learned to reason, or have they learned to pattern-match over reasoning traces? This paper argues for a specific answer: reasoning is iterative operator application in state spaces, converging to fixed points. This definition is not merely philosophical -- it has concrete architectural implications that explain both the failures of current systems and the path to genuine reasoning capabilities. Our investigation begins with a puzzle (OpenXOR), progresses through theory (OpenOperator), and culminates in a working solution (OpenLM) that achieves 76\% accuracy where state-of-the-art LLMs achieve 0\%. This is not about criticizing existing systems, but about understanding what reasoning requires and building architectures that provide it.

Recent advanced large reasoning models (LRMs) leverage extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Despite their success, we identify a critical issue: a substantial portion of simple tasks solved by LRMs can also be addressed by non-reasoning LLMs using significantly fewer tokens, indicating the complex reasoning may not always be necessary. To address this, we systematically analyze the reasoning trajectories of LRMs and present a method utilizing identified paradigms and LLM-Judge to classify these trajectories as either Redundant Reasoning or Essential Reasoning. And we introduce OThink-R1, a method that prunes redundant reasoning steps while preserving logical validity. OThink-R1 dynamically employs the non-thinking mode (fast-thinking) for straightforward problems while engaging in deliberate thinking (slow-thinking) for complex problems. Experiments across mathematical and question-answering tasks demonstrate that OThink-R1 reduces reasoning redundancy by almost 23\% on average without compromising accuracy, offering practical guidelines for efficient reasoning models. The code is available at https://github.com/AgenticIR-Lab/OThink-R1.

There is intense interest in investigating how inference time compute (ITC) (e.g. repeated sampling, refinements, etc) can improve large language model (LLM) capabilities. At the same time, recent breakthroughs in reasoning models, such as Deepseek-R1, unlock the opportunity for reinforcement learning to improve LLM reasoning skills. An in-depth understanding of how ITC interacts with reasoning across different models could provide important guidance on how to further advance the LLM frontier. This work conducts a comprehensive analysis of inference-time scaling methods for both reasoning and non-reasoning models on challenging reasoning tasks. Specifically, we focus our research on verifier-free inference time-scaling methods due to its generalizability without needing a reward model. We construct the Pareto frontier of quality and efficiency. We find that non-reasoning models, even with an extremely high inference budget, still fall substantially behind reasoning models. For reasoning models, majority voting proves to be a robust inference strategy, generally competitive or outperforming other more sophisticated ITC methods like best-of-N and sequential revisions, while the additional inference compute offers minimal improvements. We further perform in-depth analyses of the association of key response features (length and linguistic markers) with response quality, with which we can improve the existing ITC methods. We find that correct responses from reasoning models are typically shorter and have fewer hedging and thinking markers (but more discourse markers) than the incorrect responses.

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

We introduce Seed1.5-Thinking, capable of reasoning through thinking before responding, resulting in improved performance on a wide range of benchmarks. Seed1.5-Thinking achieves 86.7 on AIME 2024, 55.0 on Codeforces and 77.3 on GPQA, demonstrating excellent reasoning abilities in STEM and coding. Beyond reasoning tasks, the method demonstrates notable generalization across diverse domains. For instance, it surpasses DeepSeek R1 by 8% in win rate on non-reasoning tasks, indicating its broader applicability. Compared to other state-of-the-art reasoning models, Seed1.5-Thinking is a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model with a relatively small size, featuring 20B activated and 200B total parameters. As part of our effort to assess generalized reasoning, we develop two internal benchmarks, BeyondAIME and Codeforces, both of which will be publicly released to support future research. Model trial link: https://www.volcengine.com/experience/ark.

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Reasoning models enhance performance by tackling problems in a step-by-step manner, decomposing them into sub-problems and exploring long chains of thought before producing an answer. However, applying extended reasoning to every step introduces substantial redundancy, as sub-problems vary widely in difficulty and complexity: a small number of pivotal steps are genuinely challenging and decisive for the final answer, while many others only involve straightforward revisions or simple computations. Therefore, a natural idea is to endow reasoning models with the ability to adaptively respond to this variation, rather than treating all steps with the same level of elaboration. To this end, we propose MixReasoning, a framework that dynamically adjusts the depth of reasoning within a single response. The resulting chain of thought then becomes a mixture of detailed reasoning on difficult steps and concise inference on simpler ones. Experiments on GSM8K, MATH-500, and AIME show that MixReasoning shortens reasoning length and substantially improves efficiency without compromising accuracy.

Reasoning about time and temporal relations is an integral aspect of human cognition, essential for perceiving the world and navigating our experiences. Though large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in many reasoning tasks, temporal reasoning remains challenging due to its intrinsic complexity. In this work, we first study an essential task of temporal reasoning -- temporal graph generation, to unveil LLMs' inherent, global reasoning capabilities. We show that this task presents great challenges even for the most powerful LLMs, such as GPT-3.5/4. We also notice a significant performance gap by small models (<10B) that lag behind LLMs by 50%. Next, we study how to close this gap with a budget constraint, e.g., not using model finetuning. We propose a new prompting technique tailored for temporal reasoning, Narrative-of-Thought (NoT), that first converts the events set to a Python class, then prompts a small model to generate a temporally grounded narrative, guiding the final generation of a temporal graph. Extensive experiments showcase the efficacy of NoT in improving various metrics. Notably, NoT attains the highest F1 on the Schema-11 evaluation set, while securing an overall F1 on par with GPT-3.5. NoT also achieves the best structural similarity across the board, even compared with GPT-3.5/4. Our code is available at https://github.com/launchnlp/NoT.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs) but often leads to verbose and redundant outputs, thus increasing inference cost. We hypothesize that many reasoning steps are unnecessary for producing correct answers. To investigate this, we start with a systematic study to examine what is the minimum reasoning required for a model to reach a stable decision. We find that on math reasoning tasks like math, models typically converge to their final answers after 60\% of the reasoning steps, suggesting substantial redundancy in the remaining content. Based on these insights, we propose three inference-time strategies to improve efficiency: (1) early stopping via answer consistency, (2) boosting the probability of generating end-of-reasoning signals, and (3) a supervised method that learns when to stop based on internal activations. Experiments across five benchmarks and five open-weights LLMs show that our methods significantly reduce token usage with little or no accuracy drop. In particular, on NaturalQuestions, Answer Consistency reduces tokens by over 40\% while further improving accuracy. Our work underscores the importance of cost-effective reasoning methods that operate at inference time, offering practical benefits for real-world applications.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Hybrid reasoning systems that combine learned components with model-based inference are increasingly deployed in tool-augmented decision loops, yet their runtime behavior under partial observability and sustained evidence mismatch remains poorly understood. In practice, failures often arise as gradual divergence of internal reasoning dynamics rather than as isolated prediction errors. This work studies runtime stability in hybrid reasoning systems from a Kalman-inspired perspective. We model reasoning as a stochastic inference process driven by an internal innovation signal and introduce cognitive drift as a measurable runtime phenomenon. Stability is defined in terms of detectability, bounded divergence, and recoverability rather than task-level correctness. We propose a runtime stability framework that monitors innovation statistics, detects emerging instability, and triggers recovery-aware control mechanisms. Experiments on multi-step, tool-augmented reasoning tasks demonstrate reliable instability detection prior to task failure and show that recovery, when feasible, re-establishes bounded internal behavior within finite time. These results emphasize runtime stability as a system-level requirement for reliable reasoning under uncertainty.

Reasoning capabilities have significantly improved the performance of vision-language models (VLMs) in domains such as mathematical problem-solving, coding, and visual question-answering. However, their impact on real-world applications remains unclear. This paper presents the first empirical study on the effectiveness of reasoning-enabled VLMs in mobile GUI agents, a domain that requires interpreting complex screen layouts, understanding user instructions, and executing multi-turn interactions. We evaluate two pairs of commercial models--Gemini 2.0 Flash and Claude 3.7 Sonnet--comparing their base and reasoning-enhanced versions across two static benchmarks (ScreenSpot and AndroidControl) and one interactive environment (AndroidWorld). We surprisingly find the Claude 3.7 Sonnet reasoning model achieves state-of-the-art performance on AndroidWorld. However, reasoning VLMs generally offer marginal improvements over non-reasoning models on static benchmarks and even degrade performance in some agent setups. Notably, reasoning and non-reasoning VLMs fail on different sets of tasks, suggesting that reasoning does have an impact, but its benefits and drawbacks counterbalance each other. We attribute these inconsistencies to the limitations of benchmarks and VLMs. Based on the findings, we provide insights for further enhancing mobile GUI agents in terms of benchmarks, VLMs, and their adaptability in dynamically invoking reasoning VLMs. The experimental data are publicly available at https://github.com/LlamaTouch/VLM-Reasoning-Traces.

Advanced reasoning in large language models has achieved remarkable performance on challenging tasks, but the prevailing long-context reasoning paradigm faces critical limitations: quadratic computational scaling with sequence length, reasoning constrained by maximum context boundaries, and performance degradation beyond pre-training context windows. Existing approaches primarily compress reasoning chains without addressing the fundamental scaling problem. To overcome these challenges, we introduce InftyThink, a paradigm that transforms monolithic reasoning into an iterative process with intermediate summarization. By interleaving short reasoning segments with concise progress summaries, our approach enables unbounded reasoning depth while maintaining bounded computational costs. This creates a characteristic sawtooth memory pattern that significantly reduces computational complexity compared to traditional approaches. Furthermore, we develop a methodology for reconstructing long-context reasoning datasets into our iterative format, transforming OpenR1-Math into 333K training instances. Experiments across multiple model architectures demonstrate that our approach reduces computational costs while improving performance, with Qwen2.5-Math-7B showing 3-13% improvements across MATH500, AIME24, and GPQA_diamond benchmarks. Our work challenges the assumed trade-off between reasoning depth and computational efficiency, providing a more scalable approach to complex reasoning without architectural modifications.

We aim to improve the reasoning capabilities of language models via reinforcement learning (RL). Recent RL post-trained models like DeepSeek-R1 have demonstrated reasoning abilities on mathematical and coding tasks. However, prior studies suggest that using RL alone to improve reasoning on inherently difficult tasks is less effective. Here, we draw inspiration from curriculum learning and propose to schedule tasks from easy to hard (E2H), allowing LLMs to build reasoning skills gradually. Our method is termed E2H Reasoner. Empirically, we observe that, although easy tasks are important initially, fading them out through appropriate scheduling is essential in preventing overfitting. Theoretically, we establish convergence guarantees for E2H Reasoner within an approximate policy iteration framework. We derive finite-sample complexity bounds and show that when tasks are appropriately decomposed and conditioned, learning through curriculum stages requires fewer total samples than direct learning. Experiments across multiple domains show that E2H Reasoner significantly improves the reasoning ability of small LLMs (1.5B to 3B), which otherwise struggle when trained with vanilla RL alone, highlighting the effectiveness of our method. Our code can be found on https://github.com/divelab/E2H-Reasoning.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Time series reasoning treats time as a first-class axis and incorporates intermediate evidence directly into the answer. This survey defines the problem and organizes the literature by reasoning topology with three families: direct reasoning in one step, linear chain reasoning with explicit intermediates, and branch-structured reasoning that explores, revises, and aggregates. The topology is crossed with the main objectives of the field, including traditional time series analysis, explanation and understanding, causal inference and decision making, and time series generation, while a compact tag set spans these axes and captures decomposition and verification, ensembling, tool use, knowledge access, multimodality, agent loops, and LLM alignment regimes. Methods and systems are reviewed across domains, showing what each topology enables and where it breaks down in faithfulness or robustness, along with curated datasets, benchmarks, and resources that support study and deployment (https://github.com/blacksnail789521/Time-Series-Reasoning-Survey). Evaluation practices that keep evidence visible and temporally aligned are highlighted, and guidance is distilled on matching topology to uncertainty, grounding with observable artifacts, planning for shift and streaming, and treating cost and latency as design budgets. We emphasize that reasoning structures must balance capacity for grounding and self-correction against computational cost and reproducibility, while future progress will likely depend on benchmarks that tie reasoning quality to utility and on closed-loop testbeds that trade off cost and risk under shift-aware, streaming, and long-horizon settings. Taken together, these directions mark a shift from narrow accuracy toward reliability at scale, enabling systems that not only analyze but also understand, explain, and act on dynamic worlds with traceable evidence and credible outcomes.

In-context learning (ICL) adapts large language models (LLMs) to new tasks by conditioning on demonstrations in the prompt without parameter updates. With long-context models, many-shot ICL can use dozens to hundreds of examples and achieve performance comparable to fine-tuning, yet current understanding of its scaling behavior is largely derived from non-reasoning tasks. We study many-shot chain-of-thought in-context learning (CoT-ICL) for reasoning and show that standard many-shot rules do not transfer. Across non-reasoning and reasoning-oriented LLMs and across non-reasoning and reasoning tasks, we find: (i) a setting-dependent scaling effect, where increasing the number of CoT demonstrations is unstable for non-reasoning LLMs and benefits mainly reasoning-oriented LLMs; (ii) similarity-based retrieval helps on non-reasoning tasks but fails on reasoning, since semantic similarity poorly predicts procedural (i.e., CoT) compatibility; and (iii) an order-scaling effect, where performance variance grows with more CoT demonstrations. We interpret these behaviors by viewing many-shot CoT-ICL as in-context test-time learning rather than scaled pattern matching, and suggests two principles: (i) demonstrations should be easy for the target model to understand, and (ii) they should be ordered to support a smooth conceptual progression. Guided by the principle, we propose Curvilinear Demonstration Selection (CDS), a simple ordering method that yields up to a 5.42 percentage-point gain on geometry with 64 demonstrations. Overall, our results reframe the long context window from a retrieval buffer into a structured curriculum for in-context test-time learning.

Proving theorems in Lean 4 often requires identifying a scattered set of library lemmas whose joint use enables a concise proof -- a task we call global premise retrieval. Existing tools address adjacent problems: semantic search engines find individual declarations matching a query, while premise-selection systems predict useful lemmas one tactic step at a time. Neither recovers the full premise set an entire theorem requires. We present LeanSearch v2, a two-mode retrieval system for this task. Its standard mode applies a hierarchy-informalized Mathlib corpus with an embedding-reranker pipeline, achieving state-of-the-art single-query retrieval without domain-specific fine-tuning (nDCG@10 of 0.62 vs. 0.53 for the next-best system). Its reasoning mode builds on standard mode as its retrieval substrate, targeting global premise retrieval through iterative sketch-retrieve-reflect cycles. On a 69-query benchmark of research-level Mathlib theorems, reasoning mode recovers 46.1% of ground-truth premise groups within 10 retrieved candidates, outperforming strong reasoning retrieval systems (38.0%) and premise-selection baselines (9.3%) on the same benchmark. In a controlled downstream evaluation with a fixed prover loop, replacing alternative retrievers with LeanSearch v2 yields the highest proof success (20% vs. 16% for the next-best system and 4% without retrieval), confirming that retrieval quality propagates to proof generation. We have open-sourced all code, data, and benchmarks. Code and data: https://github.com/frenzymath/LeanSearch-v2 . The standard mode is publicly available with API access at https://leansearch.net/ .

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

As the widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) accelerates, token consumption from intermediate reasoning traces increasingly contributes to inference latency and operational cost. Recent studies suggest that many real-world tasks require little to no explicit reasoning, with additional reasoning sometimes even degrading performance. In this work, we propose Post-Reasoning, a simple yet effective approach that improves instruction-tuned models by conditioning them to justify their answers after generating the final response. By design, it enables the final answer to be obtained without additional latency or token cost, while still improving performance through simple instruction augmentation. We evaluate Post-Reasoning across \(117\) model--benchmark settings spanning \(13\) open and proprietary models, \(4\) model families, and \(9\) diverse reasoning and knowledge-intensive benchmarks, including AMC, HMMT, GSM8K, GPQA, MMLU-Pro, and BIG-Bench Hard. Post-Reasoning improves performance in over \(88.19\%\) of evaluated settings, achieving a mean relative improvements of \(17.37\%\). Furthermore, we propose supervised post-reason tuning, which further improves performance in over \(91.11\%\) of evaluated settings, and exceeds the prompt-based post-reasoning baseline by an average of \(8.01\%\), demonstrating that post-reasoning can be effectively internalized through training. Ultimately, Post-Reasoning establishes a new performance ceiling for direct-answer capabilities.

Reasoning has become a central paradigm for large language models (LLMs), consistently boosting accuracy across diverse benchmarks. Yet its suitability for precision-sensitive tasks remains unclear. We present the first systematic study of reasoning for classification tasks under strict low false positive rate (FPR) regimes. Our analysis covers two tasks--safety detection and hallucination detection--evaluated in both fine-tuned and zero-shot settings, using standard LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Our results reveal a clear trade-off: Think On (reasoning-augmented) generation improves overall accuracy, but underperforms at the low-FPR thresholds essential for practical use. In contrast, Think Off (no reasoning during inference) dominates in these precision-sensitive regimes, with Think On surpassing only when higher FPRs are acceptable. In addition, we find token-based scoring substantially outperforms self-verbalized confidence for precision-sensitive deployments. Finally, a simple ensemble of the two modes recovers the strengths of each. Taken together, our findings position reasoning as a double-edged tool: beneficial for average accuracy, but often ill-suited for applications requiring strict precision.

Recent LLMs have significantly improved reasoning capabilities, primarily by including an explicit, lengthy Thinking process as part of generation. In this paper, we question whether this explicit thinking is necessary. Using the state-of-the-art DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen, we find that bypassing the thinking process via simple prompting, denoted as NoThinking, can be surprisingly effective. When controlling for the number of tokens, NoThinking outperforms Thinking across a diverse set of seven challenging reasoning datasets--including mathematical problem solving, formal theorem proving, and coding--especially in low-budget settings, e.g., 51.3 vs. 28.9 on ACM 23 with 700 tokens. Notably, the performance of NoThinking becomes more competitive with pass@k as k increases. Building on this observation, we demonstrate that a parallel scaling approach that uses NoThinking to generate N outputs independently and aggregates them is highly effective. For aggregation, we use task-specific verifiers when available, or we apply simple best-of-N strategies such as confidence-based selection. Our method outperforms a range of baselines with similar latency using Thinking, and is comparable to Thinking with significantly longer latency (up to 9x). Together, our research encourages a reconsideration of the necessity of lengthy thinking processes, while also establishing a competitive reference for achieving strong reasoning performance in low-budget settings or at low latency using parallel scaling.

Geometric Problem Solving (GPS) remains at the heart of enhancing mathematical reasoning in large language models because it requires the combination of diagrammatic understanding, symbolic manipulation and logical inference. In existing literature, researchers have chiefly focused on synchronising the diagram descriptions with text literals and solving the problem. In this vein, they have either taken a neural, symbolic or neuro-symbolic approach. But this solves only the first two of the requirements, namely diagrammatic understanding and symbolic manipulation, while leaving logical inference underdeveloped. The logical inference is often limited to one chain-of-thought (CoT). To address this weakness in hitherto existing models, this paper proposes MARS-GPS, that generates multiple parallel reasoning rollouts augmented with Python code execution for numerical verification, ranks them using token-level entropy as a confidence signal, and aggregates answers through a multi-stage voting and self-verification pipeline. Empirical results show that MARS-GPS with 8 parallel rollouts achieves 88.8% on Geometry3K, a nearly +11% improvement over the prior state-of-the-art, with accuracy scaling consistently as the number of rollouts increases from 1 to 16 (+6.0% on ablation subset). We provide our code and data in an anonymous repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MARS-GPS-DE55.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

A central question in artificial intelligence is the extent to which machine learning models comprehend mathematics. To address this, we propose a novel framework for measuring mathematical reasoning that moves beyond standard benchmarks to diagnose specific failure points. Our method first generates structured, step-by-step reasoning from gpt-3.5-turbo on the GSM8K dataset. We then use a more capable analyst model, gpt-4o-mini, to categorize errors and, crucially, perform an unsupervised clustering of every reasoning sentence to identify emergent "reasoning modes." This analysis reveals a cognitive profile with a stark, nonhuman-like brittleness: while the model achieves near-perfect accuracy on procedural modes like sequential calculation, its performance on modes requiring combinatorial reasoning with restrictions plummets. By identifying and quantifying the reliability of these distinct reasoning skills, our work provides a more granular method to evaluate mathematical comprehension and offers a precise roadmap for developing new capabilities and more reliable future applications.

Deep iterative chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning enables LLMs to tackle complex tasks by progressively activating relevant pre-trained knowledge. However, it faces challenges in ensuring continual improvement and determining a stopping criterion. In this paper, we investigate whether the relevant knowledge that contributes directly to solving the given question can be activated from the initial reasoning path, thus circumventing the need for iterative refinement. Our experiments reveal that increasing the diversity of initial reasoning paths can achieve comparable or superior performance, a concept we term breadth reasoning. However, existing breadth reasoning approaches, such as self-consistency, offer limited diversity. To address this limitation, we propose a simple yet effective method that enhances reasoning breadth by integrating contextual exploration with reduced sampling randomness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms deep iterative reasoning. Our code is provided in https://github.com/zongqianwu/breadth.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has recently demonstrated notable success in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, particularly in mathematics and programming tasks. It is widely believed that RLVR enables LLMs to continuously self-improve, thus acquiring novel reasoning abilities that exceed corresponding base models' capacity. In this study, however, we critically re-examines this assumption by measuring the pass@k metric with large values of k to explore the reasoning capability boundary of the models across a wide range of model families and benchmarks. Surprisingly, the RL does not, in fact, elicit fundamentally new reasoning patterns. While RL-trained models outperform their base models at smaller values of k (\eg, k=1), base models can achieve a comparable or even higher pass@k score compared to their RL counterparts at large k values. The reasoning paths generated by RL-trained models are already included in the base models' sampling distribution, suggesting that most reasoning abilities manifested in RL-trained models are already obtained by base models. Further analysis shows that RL training boosts the performance by biasing the model's output distribution toward paths that are more likely to yield rewards, therefore sampling correct responses more efficiently. But this also results in a narrower reasoning capability boundary compared to base models. Similar results are observed in visual reasoning tasks trained with RLVR. Moreover, we find that distillation can genuinely introduce new knowledge into the model, different from RLVR. These findings underscore a critical limitation of RLVR in advancing LLM reasoning abilities which requires us to fundamentally rethink the impact of RL training in reasoning LLMs and the need of a better paradigm. Project Page: https://limit-of-RLVR.github.io

Large reasoning models achieve strong performance by scaling inference-time chain-of-thought, but this paradigm suffers from quadratic cost, context length limits, and degraded reasoning due to lost-in-the-middle effects. Iterative reasoning mitigates these issues by periodically summarizing intermediate thoughts, yet existing methods rely on supervised learning or fixed heuristics and fail to optimize when to summarize, what to preserve, and how to resume reasoning. We propose InftyThink+, an end-to-end reinforcement learning framework that optimizes the entire iterative reasoning trajectory, building on model-controlled iteration boundaries and explicit summarization. InftyThink+ adopts a two-stage training scheme with supervised cold-start followed by trajectory-level reinforcement learning, enabling the model to learn strategic summarization and continuation decisions. Experiments on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B show that InftyThink+ improves accuracy by 21% on AIME24 and outperforms conventional long chain-of-thought reinforcement learning by a clear margin, while also generalizing better to out-of-distribution benchmarks. Moreover, InftyThink+ significantly reduces inference latency and accelerates reinforcement learning training, demonstrating improved reasoning efficiency alongside stronger performance.

For Large Language Models (LLMs) to be reliably deployed in both everyday and high-stakes domains, knowing when not to answer is equally critical as answering correctly. Real-world user queries, which can be underspecified, ill-posed, or fundamentally unanswerable, require LLMs to reason about uncertainty and selectively abstain -- i.e., refuse to answer definitively. However, abstention remains understudied, without a systematic evaluation framework for modern LLMs. In this work, we introduce AbstentionBench, a large-scale benchmark for holistically evaluating abstention across 20 diverse datasets, including questions with unknown answers, underspecification, false premises, subjective interpretations, and outdated information. Evaluating 20 frontier LLMs reveals abstention is an unsolved problem, and one where scaling models is of little use. While recent reasoning LLMs have shown impressive results in complex problem solving, surprisingly, we find that reasoning fine-tuning degrades abstention (by 24% on average), even for math and science domains on which reasoning models are explicitly trained. We find that while a carefully crafted system prompt can boost abstention in practice, it does not resolve models' fundamental inability to reason about uncertainty. We release AbstentionBench to foster research into advancing LLM reliability.

Reasoning models often spend a significant amount of time thinking before they generate a visible response. In the meantime, they do not give the user any hints as to whether their reasoning is on the right track, and do not give the user any recourse to stop and correct them if their reasoning is flawed. This creates a frustrating, but unfortunately common, experience: the user's time is wasted while the model reasons from a false premise that could have easily been corrected. In contrast, human speakers typically perform lightweight, incremental grounding acts to ensure that participants in the conversation are on the same page; here we ask if language models can learn to leverage a similar type of behavior? With this motivation, we propose interleaved reasoning (IR), in which the model alternates between thinking and surfacing intermediate responses, as an alternative to the standard "think-then-answer" approach. By providing useful information to the user earlier, IR reduces perceived latency, the time a user waits for an initial output, without compromising the quality of the final response. We further introduce a specialization of interleaved reasoning, Plantain (Plan-Thought-Answer Interleaving), where the first intermediate response is an explicit, step-by-step plan for executing the task. This plan-first strategy allows for user intervention and early feedback for subsequent reasoning steps. We demonstrate that Plantain yields an ~6% improvement in pass@1 across several challenging math reasoning and coding benchmarks, while reducing time-to-first-response by over 60% relative to think-then-answer baselines.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

On-policy self-distillation, where a student is pulled toward a copy of itself conditioned on privileged context (e.g., a verified solution or feedback), offers a promising direction for advancing reasoning capability without a stronger external teacher. Yet in math reasoning the gains are inconsistent, even when the same approach succeeds elsewhere. A pointwise mutual information analysis traces the failure to the privileged context itself: it inflates the teacher's confidence on tokens already implied by the solution (structural connectives, verifiable claims) and deflates it on deliberation tokens ("Wait", "Let", "Maybe") that drive multi-step search. We propose Anti-Self-Distillation (AntiSD), which ascends a divergence between student and teacher rather than descending it: this reverses the per-token sign and yields a naturally bounded advantage in one step. An entropy-triggered gate disables the term once the teacher entropy collapses, completing a drop-in replacement for default self-distillation. Across five models from 4B to 30B parameters on math reasoning benchmarks, AntiSD reaches the GRPO baseline's accuracy in 2 to 10x fewer training steps and improves final accuracy by up to 11.5 points. AntiSD opens a path to scalable self-improvement, where a language model bootstraps its own reasoning through its training signal.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

While the ``deep reasoning'' paradigm has spurred significant advances in verifiable domains like mathematics, its application to open-ended, creative generation remains a critical challenge. The two dominant methods for instilling reasoning -- reinforcement learning (RL) and instruction distillation -- falter in this area; RL struggles with the absence of clear reward signals and high-quality reward models, while distillation is prohibitively expensive and capped by the teacher model's capabilities. To overcome these limitations, we introduce REverse-Engineered Reasoning (REER), a new paradigm that fundamentally shifts the approach. Instead of building a reasoning process ``forwards'' through trial-and-error or imitation, REER works ``backwards'' from known-good solutions to computationally discover the latent, step-by-step deep reasoning process that could have produced them. Using this scalable, gradient-free approach, we curate and open-source DeepWriting-20K, a large-scale dataset of 20,000 deep reasoning trajectories for open-ended tasks. Our model, DeepWriter-8B, trained on this data, not only surpasses strong open-source baselines but also achieves performance competitive with, and at times superior to, leading proprietary models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

We have witnessed that strong LLMs like Qwen-Math, MiMo, and Phi-4 possess immense reasoning potential inherited from the pre-training stage. With reinforcement learning (RL), these models can improve dramatically on reasoning tasks. Recent studies have shown that even RL on a single problem can unleash these models' reasoning capabilities. However, RL is not only expensive but also unstable. Even one-shot RL requires hundreds of GPU hours. This raises a critical question: Is there a more efficient way to unleash the reasoning potential of these powerful base LLMs? In this work, we demonstrate that Critique Fine-Tuning (CFT) on only one problem can effectively unleash the reasoning potential of LLMs. Our method constructs critique data by collecting diverse model-generated solutions to a single problem and using teacher LLMs to provide detailed critiques. We fine-tune Qwen and Llama family models, ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, on the CFT data and observe significant performance gains across diverse reasoning tasks. For example, with just 5 GPU hours of training, Qwen-Math-7B-CFT show an average improvement of 15% on six math benchmarks and 16% on three logic reasoning benchmarks. These results are comparable to or even surpass the results from RL with 20x less compute. Ablation studies reveal the robustness of one-shot CFT across different prompt problems. These results highlight one-shot CFT as a simple, general, and compute-efficient approach to unleashing the reasoning capabilities of modern LLMs.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1, have demonstrated the significant effectiveness of test-time scaling, achieving substantial performance gains across various benchmarks. These advanced models utilize deliberate "thinking" steps to systematically enhance answer quality. In this paper, we propose leveraging these high-quality outputs generated by reasoning-intensive models to improve less computationally demanding, non-reasoning models. We explore and compare methodologies for utilizing the answers produced by reasoning models to train and improve non-reasoning models. Through straightforward Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) experiments on established benchmarks, we demonstrate consistent improvements across various benchmarks, underscoring the potential of this approach for advancing the ability of models to answer questions directly.

Recent work shows that, beyond discrete reasoning through explicit chain-of-thought steps, which are limited by the boundaries of natural languages, large language models (LLMs) can also reason continuously in latent space, allowing richer information per step and thereby improving token efficiency. Despite this promise, latent reasoning still faces two challenges, especially in training-free settings: 1) purely latent reasoning broadens the search distribution by maintaining multiple implicit paths, which diffuses probability mass, introduces noise, and impedes convergence to a single high-confidence solution, thereby hurting accuracy; and 2) overthinking persists even without explicit text, wasting tokens and degrading efficiency. To address these issues, we introduce SwiReasoning, a training-free framework for LLM reasoning which features two key innovations: 1) SwiReasoning dynamically switches between explicit and latent reasoning, guided by block-wise confidence estimated from entropy trends in next-token distributions, to balance exploration and exploitation and promote timely convergence. 2) By limiting the maximum number of thinking-block switches, SwiReasoning curbs overthinking and improves token efficiency across varying problem difficulties. On widely used mathematics and STEM benchmarks, SwiReasoning consistently improves average accuracy by 1.5%-2.8% across reasoning LLMs of different model families and scales. Furthermore, under constrained budgets, SwiReasoning improves average token efficiency by 56%-79%, with larger gains as budgets tighten.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Despite the superior performance of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), their reasoning behaviors are often counterintuitive, leading to suboptimal reasoning capabilities. To theoretically formalize the desired reasoning behaviors, this paper presents the Laws of Reasoning (LoRe), a unified framework that characterizes intrinsic reasoning patterns in LRMs. We first propose compute law with the hypothesis that the reasoning compute should scale linearly with question complexity. Beyond compute, we extend LoRe with a supplementary accuracy law. Since the question complexity is difficult to quantify in practice, we examine these hypotheses by two properties of the laws, monotonicity and compositionality. We therefore introduce LoRe-Bench, a benchmark that systematically measures these two tractable properties for large reasoning models. Evaluation shows that most reasoning models exhibit reasonable monotonicity but lack compositionality. In response, we develop an effective finetuning approach that enforces compute-law compositionality. Extensive empirical studies demonstrate that better compliance with compute laws yields consistently improved reasoning performance on multiple benchmarks, and uncovers synergistic effects across properties and laws. Project page: https://lore-project.github.io/

Machine unlearning has gained increasing attention in recent years, as a promising technique to selectively remove unwanted privacy or copyrighted information from Large Language Models that are trained on a massive scale of human data. However, the emergence of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which emphasize long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to address complex questions, presents a dilemma to unlearning: existing methods either struggle to completely eliminate undesired knowledge from the CoT traces or degrade the reasoning performances due to the interference with the reasoning process. To this end, we introduce Counterfactual Unlearning through iterative Preference Optimization (CiPO), a novel framework that redefines unlearning as the targeted intervention of the CoT reasoning in LRMs. More specifically, given a desired unlearning target answer, CiPO instructs LRMs to generate a logically valid counterfactual reasoning trace for preference tuning. As the LRM adjusts to the counterfactual trace, CiPO iteratively updates the preference learning data to increase the discrepancy from the original model. This iterative loop ensures both desirable unlearning and smooth optimization, effectively mitigating the dilemma. Experiments on challenging benchmarks demonstrate that CiPO excels at unlearning, completely removing knowledge from both the intermediate CoT steps and the final answer, while preserving the reasoning abilities of LRMs.

Reasoning LLMs-as-Judges, which can benefit from inference-time scaling, provide a promising path for extending the success of reasoning models to non-verifiable domains where the output correctness/quality cannot be directly checked. However, while reasoning judges have shown better performance on static evaluation benchmarks, their effectiveness in actual policy training has not been systematically examined. Therefore, we conduct a rigorous study to investigate the actual impact of non-reasoning and reasoning judges in reinforcement-learning-based LLM alignment. Our controlled synthetic setting, where a "gold-standard" judge (gpt-oss-120b) provides preference annotations to train smaller judges, reveals key differences between non-reasoning and reasoning judges: non-reasoning judges lead to reward hacking easily, while reasoning judges can lead to policies that achieve strong performance when evaluated by the gold-standard judge. Interestingly, we find that the reasoning-judge-trained policies achieve such strong performance by learning to generate highly effective adversarial outputs that can also score well on popular benchmarks such as Arena-Hard by deceiving other LLM-judges. Combined with our further analysis, our study highlights both important findings and room for improvements for applying (reasoning) LLM-judges in non-verifiable LLM post-training.

As LLMs become increasingly prevalent, it is interesting to consider how ``creative'' these models can be. From cognitive science, creativity consists of at least two key characteristics: convergent thinking (purposefulness to achieve a given goal) and divergent thinking (adaptability to new environments or constraints) runco2003critical. In this work, we introduce a framework for quantifying LLM creativity that incorporates the two characteristics. This is achieved by (1) Denial Prompting pushes LLMs to come up with more creative solutions to a given problem by incrementally imposing new constraints on the previous solution, compelling LLMs to adopt new strategies, and (2) defining and computing the NeoGauge metric which examines both convergent and divergent thinking in the generated creative responses by LLMs. We apply the proposed framework on Codeforces problems, a natural data source for collecting human coding solutions. We quantify NeoGauge for various proprietary and open-source models and find that even the most creative model, GPT-4, still falls short of demonstrating human-like creativity. We also experiment with advanced reasoning strategies (MCTS, self-correction, etc.) and observe no significant improvement in creativity. As a by-product of our analysis, we release NeoCoder dataset for reproducing our results on future models.

Large reasoning models (e.g., R1, o3) have demonstrated remarkable mathematical problem-solving abilities. However, the high reported accuracy of these advanced models on popular datasets, reliance on purely numerical evaluation and potential benchmark leakage, often masks their true reasoning shortcomings. To address this, we propose leveraging the inherent rigor and methodological complexity of mathematical proofs as a diagnostic tool to expose these hidden failures. Specifically, we introduce the RFMDataset (Reveal Failure Modes), a collection of 200 diverse mathematical proof problems, and thoroughly evaluate advanced models' performance on it. Our in-depth analysis of their failures uncovers 10 fine-grained error types, which shows fundamental limitations in current large reasoning models: 1) large reasoning models grapple profoundly with mathematical proofs, with some generating entirely correct proofs for less than 20% of problems and failing even on basic ones; 2) models exhibit a diverse spectrum of reasoning failures, prominently demonstrating the lack of guarantees for the correctness and rigor of single-step reasoning; and 3) models show hallucination and incompleteness during the reasoning process. Our findings reveal that models' self-reflection is insufficient to resolve the current logical dilemmas, necessitating formalized and fine-grained logical training.

Self-consistency has emerged as a popular technique for improving large language model accuracy on reasoning tasks. The approach is straightforward: generate multiple reasoning paths and select the most common answer through majority voting. While this reliably boosts accuracy, it remains unclear whether these gains reflect genuine improvements in reasoning quality. We investigate a fundamental question that has not been studied before: does inference scaling improve reasoning faithfulness? We conduct a comprehensive empirical study across four frontier models (GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5, Gemini-3-flash-preview, and DeepSeek-v3.2) on 100 GSM8K mathematical reasoning problems. Our analysis employs bootstrap confidence intervals, McNemar's tests for paired comparisons, and Cohen's d effect sizes to quantify the effects rigorously. The results reveal striking differences across models that challenge common assumptions about self-consistency. GPT-5.2 shows the expected pattern: accuracy improves from 78% to 90% at N=5, with faithfulness remaining relatively stable (0.540 to 0.510). Claude Opus 4.5 tells a completely different story. Its accuracy actually drops from 78% to 74.3% while faithfulness jumps dramatically from 0.270 to 0.891 at N=5. DeepSeek-v3.2, already at 98% accuracy, shows ceiling effects with modest faithfulness gains (0.440 to 0.541). Gemini-3-flash improves from 81% to 86% accuracy with a slight faithfulness decrease (0.260 to 0.212). Problem difficulty analysis reveals that GPT-5.2 solves 82% of hard problems while breaking only 13% of easy ones. Claude, in contrast, breaks 23% of easy problems, explaining its accuracy decrease. These findings matter for practitioners: self-consistency is not universally beneficial, and teams should test their specific models before deployment. We release our code and provide practical recommendations for navigating these tradeoffs.

The development of artificial intelligence systems with advanced reasoning capabilities represents a persistent and long-standing research question. Traditionally, the primary strategy to address this challenge involved the adoption of symbolic approaches, where knowledge was explicitly represented by means of symbols and explicitly programmed rules. However, with the advent of machine learning, there has been a paradigm shift towards systems that can autonomously learn from data, requiring minimal human guidance. In light of this shift, in latest years, there has been increasing interest and efforts at endowing neural networks with the ability to reason, bridging the gap between data-driven learning and logical reasoning. Within this context, Neural Algorithmic Reasoning (NAR) stands out as a promising research field, aiming to integrate the structured and rule-based reasoning of algorithms with the adaptive learning capabilities of neural networks, typically by tasking neural models to mimic classical algorithms. In this dissertation, we provide theoretical and practical contributions to this area of research. We explore the connections between neural networks and tropical algebra, deriving powerful architectures that are aligned with algorithm execution. Furthermore, we discuss and show the ability of such neural reasoners to learn and manipulate complex algorithmic and combinatorial optimization concepts, such as the principle of strong duality. Finally, in our empirical efforts, we validate the real-world utility of NAR networks across different practical scenarios. This includes tasks as diverse as planning problems, large-scale edge classification tasks and the learning of polynomial-time approximate algorithms for NP-hard combinatorial problems. Through this exploration, we aim to showcase the potential integrating algorithmic reasoning in machine learning models.

While long, explicit chains-of-thought (CoT) have proven effective on complex reasoning tasks, they are costly to generate during inference. Non-verbal reasoning methods have emerged with shorter generation lengths by leveraging continuous representations, yet their performance lags behind verbalized CoT. We propose Abstract Chain-of-Thought, a discrete latent reasoning post-training mechanism in which the language model produces a short sequence of tokens from a reserved vocabulary in lieu of a natural language CoT, before generating a response. To make previously unseen ''abstract'' tokens useful, we introduce a policy iteration-style warm-up loop that alternates between (i.) bottlenecking from a verbal CoT via masking and performing supervised fine-tuning, and (ii.) self-distillation by training the model to generate abstract tokens from the prompt alone via constrained decoding with the codebook. After warm-up, we optimize the generation of abstract sequences with warm-started reinforcement learning under constrained decoding. Abstract-CoT achieves up to 11.6times fewer reasoning tokens while demonstrating comparable performance across mathematical reasoning, instruction-following, and multi-hop reasoning, and generalizes across language model families. We also find an emergent power law distribution over the abstract vocabulary, akin to those seen in natural language, that evolves across the training phases. Our findings highlight the potential for post-training latent reasoning mechanisms that enable efficient inference through a learned abstract reasoning language.

Reasoning requires going beyond pattern matching or memorization of solutions to identify and implement "algorithmic procedures" that can be used to deduce answers to hard problems. Doing so requires realizing the most relevant primitives, intermediate results, or shared procedures, and building upon them. While RL post-training on long chains of thought ultimately aims to uncover this kind of algorithmic behavior, most reasoning traces learned by large models fail to consistently capture or reuse procedures, instead drifting into verbose and degenerate exploration. To address more effective reasoning, we introduce reasoning abstractions: concise natural language descriptions of procedural and factual knowledge that guide the model toward learning successful reasoning. We train models to be capable of proposing multiple abstractions given a problem, followed by RL that incentivizes building a solution while using the information provided by these abstractions. This results in a two-player RL training paradigm, abbreviated as RLAD, that jointly trains an abstraction generator and a solution generator. This setup effectively enables structured exploration, decouples learning signals of abstraction proposal and solution generation, and improves generalization to harder problems. We also show that allocating more test-time compute to generating abstractions is more beneficial for performance than generating more solutions at large test budgets, illustrating the role of abstractions in guiding meaningful exploration.

Recent advancements, such as DeepSeek-Prover-V2-671B and Kimina-Prover-Preview-72B, demonstrate a prevailing trend in leveraging reinforcement learning (RL)-based large-scale training for automated theorem proving. Surprisingly, we discover that even without any training, careful neuro-symbolic coordination of existing off-the-shelf reasoning models and tactic step provers can achieve comparable performance. This paper introduces DSP+, an improved version of the Draft, Sketch, and Prove framework, featuring a fine-grained and integrated neuro-symbolic enhancement for each phase: (1) In the draft phase, we prompt reasoning models to generate concise natural-language subgoals to benefit the sketch phase, removing thinking tokens and references to human-written proofs; (2) In the sketch phase, subgoals are autoformalized with hypotheses to benefit the proving phase, and sketch lines containing syntactic errors are masked according to predefined rules; (3) In the proving phase, we tightly integrate symbolic search methods like Aesop with step provers to establish proofs for the sketch subgoals. Experimental results show that, without any additional model training or fine-tuning, DSP+ solves 80.7\%, 32.8\%, and 24 out of 644 problems from miniF2F, ProofNet, and PutnamBench, respectively, while requiring fewer budgets compared to state-of-the-arts. DSP+ proves imo\_2019\_p1, an IMO problem in miniF2F that is not solved by any prior work. Additionally, DSP+ generates proof patterns comprehensible by human experts, facilitating the identification of formalization errors; For example, eight wrongly formalized statements in miniF2F are discovered. Our results highlight the potential of classical reasoning patterns besides the RL-based training. All components will be open-sourced.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Hierarchical reasoning model (HRM) achieves extraordinary performance on various reasoning tasks, significantly outperforming large language model-based reasoners. To understand the strengths and potential failure modes of HRM, we conduct a mechanistic study on its reasoning patterns and find three surprising facts: (a) Failure of extremely simple puzzles, e.g., HRM can fail on a puzzle with only one unknown cell. We attribute this failure to the violation of the fixed point property, a fundamental assumption of HRM. (b) "Grokking" dynamics in reasoning steps, i.e., the answer is not improved uniformly, but instead there is a critical reasoning step that suddenly makes the answer correct; (c) Existence of multiple fixed points. HRM "guesses" the first fixed point, which could be incorrect, and gets trapped there for a while or forever. All facts imply that HRM appears to be "guessing" instead of "reasoning". Leveraging this "guessing" picture, we propose three strategies to scale HRM's guesses: data augmentation (scaling the quality of guesses), input perturbation (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging inference randomness), and model bootstrapping (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging training randomness). On the practical side, by combining all methods, we develop Augmented HRM, boosting accuracy on Sudoku-Extreme from 54.5% to 96.9%. On the scientific side, our analysis provides new insights into how reasoning models "reason".

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Test-time compute has emerged as a powerful paradigm for improving the performance of large language models (LLMs), where generating multiple outputs or refining individual chains can significantly boost answer accuracy. However, existing methods like Best-of-N, majority voting, and self-reflection typically apply reasoning in a uniform way across inputs, overlooking the fact that different problems may require different levels of reasoning depth. In this work, we propose Fractional Reasoning, a training-free and model-agnostic framework that enables continuous control over reasoning intensity at inference time, going beyond the limitations of fixed instructional prompts. Our method operates by extracting the latent steering vector associated with deeper reasoning and reapplying it with a tunable scaling factor, allowing the model to tailor its reasoning process to the complexity of each input. This supports two key modes of test-time scaling: (1) improving output quality in breadth-based strategies (e.g., Best-of-N, majority voting), and (2) enhancing the correctness of individual reasoning chains in depth-based strategies (e.g., self-reflection). Experiments on GSM8K, MATH500, and GPQA demonstrate that Fractional Reasoning consistently improves performance across diverse reasoning tasks and models.

While Test-Time Scaling (TTS) has proven effective in improving the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs), low diversity in model outputs often becomes a bottleneck; this is partly caused by the common "one problem, one solution" (1P1S) training practice, which provides a single canonical answer and can push models toward a narrow set of reasoning paths. This homogenization not only limits sampling effectiveness but also restricts the exploration space for subsequent Reinforcement Learning (RL) stages. To address this, we propose a "one problem, multiple solutions" (1PNS) training paradigm that exposes the model to a variety of valid reasoning trajectories and thus increases inference diversity. A core challenge for 1PNS is reliably measuring semantic differences between multi-step chains of thought, so we introduce Reasoning Path Divergence (RPD), a step-level metric that aligns and scores Long Chain-of-Thought solutions to capture differences in intermediate reasoning. Using RPD, we curate maximally diverse solution sets per problem and fine-tune Qwen3-4B-Base. Experiments show that RPD-selected training yields more varied outputs and higher pass@k, with an average +2.80% gain in pass@16 over a strong 1P1S baseline and a +4.99% gain on AIME24, demonstrating that 1PNS further amplifies the effectiveness of TTS. Our code is available at https://github.com/fengjujf/Reasoning-Path-Divergence .

Large reasoning models exhibit remarkable reasoning capabilities via long, elaborate reasoning trajectories. Supervised fine-tuning on such reasoning traces, also known as distillation, can be a cost-effective way to boost reasoning capabilities of student models. However, empirical observations reveal that these reasoning trajectories are often suboptimal, switching excessively between different lines of thought, resulting in under-thinking, over-thinking, and even degenerate responses. We introduce Retro-Search, an MCTS-inspired search algorithm, for distilling higher quality reasoning paths from large reasoning models. Retro-Search retrospectively revises reasoning paths to discover better, yet shorter traces, which can then lead to student models with enhanced reasoning capabilities with shorter, thus faster inference. Our approach can enable two use cases: self-improvement, where models are fine-tuned on their own Retro-Search-ed thought traces, and weak-to-strong improvement, where a weaker model revises stronger model's thought traces via Retro-Search. For self-improving, R1-distill-7B, fine-tuned on its own Retro-Search-ed traces, reduces the average reasoning length by 31.2% while improving performance by 7.7% across seven math benchmarks. For weak-to-strong improvement, we retrospectively revise R1-671B's traces from the OpenThoughts dataset using R1-distill-32B as the Retro-Search-er, a model 20x smaller. Qwen2.5-32B, fine-tuned on this refined data, achieves performance comparable to R1-distill-32B, yielding an 11.3% reduction in reasoning length and a 2.4% performance improvement compared to fine-tuning on the original OpenThoughts data. Our work counters recently emergent viewpoints that question the relevance of search algorithms in the era of large reasoning models, by demonstrating that there are still opportunities for algorithmic advancements, even for frontier models.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit backtracking and self-verification mechanisms that enable them to revise intermediate steps and reach correct solutions, yielding strong performance on complex logical benchmarks. We hypothesize that such behaviors are beneficial only when the model has sufficiently strong ``critique'' ability to detect its own mistakes. This work systematically investigates how current LRMs recover from errors by inserting arithmetic mistakes in their intermediate reasoning steps. Notably, we discover a peculiar yet important phenomenon: despite the error propagating throughout the entire chain-of-thought (CoT) without any verbalized correction, the model still reaches the correct final answer after the thinking process finishes. This recovery implies the existence of an internal mechanism helping the model to detect errors and trigger self-correction, which we refer to as the hidden critique ability. Building on feature space analysis, we identify a highly interpretable critique vector representing this behavior. Extensive experiments across multiple model scales and families demonstrate that steering latent representations with this vector improves the model's error detection capability and enhances the performance of test-time scaling at no extra training cost. Our findings provide a valuable understanding of LRMs' critique behavior, suggesting a promising direction to control and improve their self-verification mechanism. Our code is available at: https://github.com/mail-research/lrm-critique-vectors.

Reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated superior capacities in solving complicated problems by generating long chain-of-thoughts (CoT), but such a lengthy CoT incurs high inference costs. In this study, we introduce ES-CoT, an inference-time method that shortens CoT generation by detecting answer convergence and stopping early with minimal performance loss. At the end of each reasoning step, we prompt the LLM to output its current final answer, denoted as a step answer. We then track the run length of consecutive identical step answers as a measure of answer convergence. Once the run length exhibits a sharp increase and exceeds a minimum threshold, the generation is terminated. We provide both empirical and theoretical support for this heuristic: step answers steadily converge to the final answer, and large run-length jumps reliably mark this convergence. Experiments on five reasoning datasets across three LLMs show that ES-CoT reduces the number of inference tokens by about 41\% on average while maintaining accuracy comparable to standard CoT. Further, ES-CoT integrates seamlessly with self-consistency prompting and remains robust across hyperparameter choices, highlighting it as a practical and effective approach for efficient reasoning.

With the emergence of advanced reasoning models like OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, their ability to perform rigorous logical reasoning remains an open question. This survey synthesizes recent advancements in logical reasoning within LLMs, a critical area of AI research. It outlines the scope of logical reasoning in LLMs, its theoretical foundations, and the benchmarks used to evaluate reasoning proficiency. We analyze existing capabilities across different reasoning paradigms - deductive, inductive, abductive, and analogical - and assess strategies to enhance reasoning performance, including data-centric tuning, reinforcement learning, decoding strategies, and neuro-symbolic approaches. The review concludes with future directions, emphasizing the need for further exploration to strengthen logical reasoning in AI systems.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) can do complex reasoning via long chain-of-thought (CoT) involving cognitive strategies such as backtracking and self-correction. Recent studies suggest that some models inherently possess these long reasoning abilities, which may be unlocked via extra training. Our work first investigates whether we can elicit such behavior without any training. To this end, we propose a decoding-time approach, ThinkLogit, which utilizes logits arithmetic (Liu et al., 2024) to tune a target large LM for long reasoning using a substantially smaller model as guider. We then show that we can further boost performance by training the guider model with preference optimization over correct/incorrect reasoning pairs sampled from both the target and guider model -- a setup we refer to as ThinkLogit-DPO. Our experiments demonstrate that ThinkLogit and ThinkLogit-DPO achieve a relative improvement in pass@1 by 26% and 29%, respectively, over four mathematical datasets using the Qwen2.5-32B when guided by R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B -- a model 21x smaller. Lastly, we show that ThinkLogit can transfer long reasoning skills acquired through reinforcement learning, improving pass@1 by 13% relative compared to the Qwen2.5-32B base model. Our work presents a computationally-efficient method to elicit long reasoning in large models with minimal or no additional training.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) achieve strong performance by generating long chains of thought (CoT), but often overthink, continuing to reason after a solution has already stabilized and thereby wasting tokens and increasing latency. Existing inference-time early-exit methods rely primarily on answer-level signals, such as confidence or trial-answer consistency, to decide when to stop. However, these signals mainly reflect answer readiness rather than reasoning convergence: they may trigger before the model has finished exploring or self-correcting, causing premature exits that can degrade final-answer accuracy and leave the retained reasoning chain semantically incomplete. We identify reasoning-level semantic redundancy as a complementary signal for semantic-preserving early exit: when successive steps no longer add novel progress and instead revisit established conclusions, the reasoning trajectory has likely converged. Building on this insight, we propose PUMA, a plug-and-play framework that combines a lightweight Redundancy Detector with answer-level verification. The detector flags semantically redundant candidate exits, while verification confirms whether stopping is safe, allowing PUMA to remove redundant continuation while preserving both answer accuracy and a coherent reasoning prefix. Across five LRMs and five challenging reasoning benchmarks, PUMA achieves 26.2% average token reduction while preserving accuracy and retained CoT quality. Additional experiments on code generation, zero-shot vision-language reasoning, and learned stopping-policy internalization further demonstrate that reasoning-level redundancy is a robust, transferable, and learnable signal for efficient reasoning. Our code is available at https://github.com/giovanni-vaccarino/PUMA.

Traditional language model-based theorem proving assumes that by training on a sufficient amount of formal proof data, a model will learn to prove theorems. Our key observation is that a wealth of informal information that is not present in formal proofs can be useful for learning to prove theorems. For instance, humans think through steps of a proof, but this thought process is not visible in the resulting code. We present Lean-STaR, a framework for training language models to produce informal thoughts prior to each step of a proof, thereby boosting the model's theorem-proving capabilities. Lean-STaR uses retrospective ground-truth tactics to generate synthetic thoughts for training the language model. At inference time, the trained model directly generates the thoughts prior to the prediction of the tactics in each proof step. Building on the self-taught reasoner framework, we then apply expert iteration to further fine-tune the model on the correct proofs it samples and verifies using the Lean solver. Lean-STaR achieves state-of-the-art results on the miniF2F-test benchmark within the Lean theorem proving environment, significantly outperforming base models (43.4% rightarrow 46.3%, Pass@64). We also analyze the impact of the augmented thoughts on various aspects of the theorem proving process, providing insights into their effectiveness.

Large language models (LLMs) empowered by chain-of-thought reasoning have achieved impressive accuracy on complex tasks but suffer from excessive inference costs and latency when applied uniformly to all problems. We propose SABER (Switchable and Balanced Training for Efficient LLM Reasoning), a reinforcement learning framework that endows LLMs with user-controllable, token-budgeted reasoning. SABER first profiles each training example's base-model thinking token usage and assigns it to one of the predefined budget tiers. During fine-tuning, the model is guided by system prompts and length-aware rewards to respect its assigned budget. In parallel, we incorporate no-think examples to ensure the model remains reliable even when explicit reasoning is turned off. SABER further supports four discrete inference modes - NoThink, FastThink, CoreThink, and DeepThink, enabling flexible trade-offs between latency and reasoning depth. Extensive evaluations on math reasoning (MATH, GSM8K), code generation (MBPP), and logical reasoning (LiveBench-Reasoning) demonstrate that SABER achieves high accuracy under tight budgets, graceful degradation, and effective cross-scale and cross-domain generalization. In particular, SABER-FastThink cuts reasoning length by 65.4% and yields a 3.6% accuracy gain compared with the base model on the MATH benchmark.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have led to notable successes in complex reasoning tasks, such as mathematical problem solving. A common strategy for improving performance is parallel thinking, in which multiple reasoning traces are generated and the final prediction is made using aggregation schemes like majority voting or best-of-N decoding. However, two key challenges persist. First, multi-sample decoding incurs substantial inference latency, especially for long-form outputs. Second, effective mechanisms for reliably assessing the correctness of individual reasoning traces are still limited. To address these challenges, we introduce One-Token Verification (OTV), a computational method that estimates reasoning correctness in a single forward pass during generation. OTV is activated by a learnable token and integrated into the LLM via low-rank adaptation to probe internal reasoning signals through the key-value cache, supporting token-level correctness estimation at any stage of generation without disrupting primary reasoning. Experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that OTV consistently surpasses existing verifiers. Additionally, OTV reduces token usage by up to 90% through correctness-guided early termination, prioritizing shorter, more reliable solutions.

Mathematical reasoning models are widely deployed in education, automated tutoring, and decision support systems despite exhibiting fundamental computational instabilities. We demonstrate that state-of-the-art models (Qwen2.5-Math-7B) achieve 61% accuracy through a mixture of reliable and unreliable reasoning pathways: 18.4% of correct predictions employ stable, faithful reasoning while 81.6% emerge through computationally inconsistent pathways. Additionally, 8.8% of all predictions are silent failures -- confident yet incorrect outputs. Through comprehensive analysis using novel faithfulness metrics, we reveal: (1) reasoning quality shows weak negative correlation with correctness (r=-0.21, p=0.002), reflecting a binary classification threshold artifact rather than a monotonic inverse relationship; (2) scaling from 1.5B to 7B parameters (4.7x increase) provides zero accuracy benefit on our evaluated subset (6% of GSM8K), requiring validation on the complete benchmark; and (3) latent reasoning employs diverse computational strategies, with ~20% sharing CoT-like patterns. These findings highlight that benchmark accuracy can mask computational unreliability, demanding evaluation reforms measuring stability beyond single-sample metrics.

Recent progress in large language models has led to the emergence of reasoning models, which have shown strong performance on complex tasks through specialized fine-tuning procedures. While these methods reliably improve pass@1 accuracy, prior works have observed that they show a coverage shrinkage behavior, where pass@k degrades relative to the base model. In this paper, we investigate the reasoning shrinkage arise under SFT-based post-training. We hypothesize that this behavior is driven by properties of the fine-tuning data, specifically related to decision points or "forks in the road" scenarios where model faces indecipherable patterns with multiple valid reasoning paths. To test this hypothesis, we design controlled case studies that simulate such decision-point settings, spanning indecipherable nodes in graph branching, and reasoning modes. By tracking post-training dynamics in these settings, we find that the shrinkage phenomenon is tightly correlated with the prevalence of decision-point scenarios in the training data. We also demonstrate that this shrinkage behavior can be partially mitigated through targeted data synthesis design of decision-points, and a more systematic diversity-encouraging decoding mechanism. Our findings identify data-centric factors as a key driver of shrinkage in reasoning models and highlight diversity-aware designs as an effective lever for controlling it.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become a central focus in today's large language model (LLM) research, where models are designed to output a step-by-step thinking process before arriving at a final answer to handle complex reasoning tasks. Despite their promise, recent empirical studies (e.g., [Shojaee et al., 2025] from Apple) suggest that this thinking process may not actually enhance reasoning ability, where LLMs without explicit reasoning actually outperform LRMs on tasks with low or high complexity. In this work, we revisit these findings and investigate whether the limitations of LRMs persist when tool augmentations are introduced. We incorporate two types of tools, Python interpreters and scratchpads, and evaluate three representative LLMs and their LRM counterparts on Apple's benchmark reasoning puzzles. Our results show that, with proper tool use, LRMs consistently outperform their non-reasoning counterparts across all levels of task complexity. These findings challenge the recent narrative that reasoning is an illusion and highlight the potential of tool-augmented LRMs for solving complex problems.

Recent work on neural algorithmic reasoning has investigated the reasoning capabilities of neural networks, effectively demonstrating they can learn to execute classical algorithms on unseen data coming from the train distribution. However, the performance of existing neural reasoners significantly degrades on out-of-distribution (OOD) test data, where inputs have larger sizes. In this work, we make an important observation: there are many different inputs for which an algorithm will perform certain intermediate computations identically. This insight allows us to develop data augmentation procedures that, given an algorithm's intermediate trajectory, produce inputs for which the target algorithm would have exactly the same next trajectory step. Then, we employ a causal framework to design a corresponding self-supervised objective, and we prove that it improves the OOD generalisation capabilities of the reasoner. We evaluate our method on the CLRS algorithmic reasoning benchmark, where we show up to 3times improvements on the OOD test data.

Cutting-edge large language models (LLMs) demonstrate promising performance in solving complex math problems with a divide-and-conquer pipeline and the assistance of in-context learning (ICL) examples. However, their potential for improvement is limited by two critical problems within their ICL examples: granularity-mismatch and the ensuing negative-effect noise problem. Specifically, the LLMs are capable of the dividing process yet mostly failed by inaccurate reasoning within a few conquer steps, while the ICL examples retrieved in question-grained sometimes lack relevant steps for a specific challenging reasoning step. Further, this disconnect may hinder the correct reasoning due to its irrelevance. To this end, we focus on improving the reasoning quality within each step and present BoostStep. BoostStep aligns the granularity between the retrieving and reasoning on step grained, and provides highly related ICL examples for each reasoning step with a novel `first-try' strategy. BoostStep provides more relevant examples than the coarse question-grained strategy, enhancing the model reasoning quality within each step steadily. BoostStep is a general and robust reasoning-enhancing method that not only improves standalone reasoning performance but also integrates seamlessly with Monte Carlo Tree Search methods (MCTS) to refine both candidate generation and decision-making. Quantitatively, it improves GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Math-72B by 3.6\% and 2.0\% respectively on various mathematical benchmarks, and 7.5\% gain combined with MCTS.

Frontier reasoning models have exhibited incredible capabilities across a wide array of disciplines, driven by posttraining large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL). However, despite the widespread success of this paradigm, much of the literature has been devoted to disentangling truly novel behaviors that emerge during RL but are not present in the base models. In our work, we approach this question from a different angle, instead asking whether comparable reasoning capabilites can be elicited from base models at inference time by pure sampling, without any additional training. Inspired by Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques for sampling from sharpened distributions, we propose a simple iterative sampling algorithm leveraging the base models' own likelihoods. Over different base models, we show that our algorithm offers substantial boosts in reasoning that nearly match and even outperform those from RL on a wide variety of single-shot tasks, including MATH500, HumanEval, and GPQA. Moreover, our sampler avoids the collapse in diversity over multiple samples that is characteristic of RL-posttraining. Crucially, our method does not require training, curated datasets, or a verifier, suggesting broad applicability beyond easily verifiable domains.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities at solving complex reasoning tasks with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, but their decision-making processes remain somewhat blackbox. We introduce textbfinverse reasoning, a novel paradigm enabling LLMs to decompose and explain their own reasoning chains post-hoc. Our approach, used in SAGE-nano, a 4-billion-parameter reasoning model, employs a metacognitive structure that reflects back via attention processes to identify major decision points and generate explanations of reasoning choices. While typical CoT approaches are directed towards forward reasoning generation, inverse reasoning provides insight into why specific reasoning chains were selected over others. Through thorough testing of logical reasoning puzzles, math problems and ethical dilemmas from AQUA-RAT, CommonsenseQA, and customized benchmarks, we demonstrate that SAGE-nano is at the cutting edge both on reasoning accuracy (74.6% on AQUA-RAT) and explanation quality (92.1% human preference score) for its task, and offers performance almost on par with models like Claude-3.5 Sonnet or GPT-4o. Our contributions are: (i) the first rigorous framework for LLM self-reflection via inverse reasoning, (ii) a novel metalearning framework to reverse the attention flow, (iii) comprehensive evaluation frameworks for reasoning transparency, and (iv) evidence that increasing reasoning using inverse reasoning improves interpretability along with reasoning performance. Our work creates new avenues for transparent AI systems and closes significant gaps in AI safety, education, and scientific discovery.

With the advent of DeepSeek-R1, a new wave of reinforcement learning (RL) methods has emerged that seem to unlock stronger mathematical reasoning. However, a closer look at the open-source ecosystem reveals a critical limitation: with sufficiently many draws (e.g., pass@1024), many existing base models already solve nearly all questions on widely used math benchmarks such as MATH-500 and AIME 2024. This suggests that the RL fine-tuning methods prevalent in the LLM reasoning literature largely sharpen existing solution modes rather than discovering entirely new ones. Such sharpening stands in contrast to the broader promise of RL: to foster exploration and to acquire new skills. To move beyond this plateau, we introduce MATH-Beyond (MATH-B), a benchmark deliberately constructed to defeat common open-source models of up to 8B parameters even under large sampling budgets. Improving performance on our benchmark via RL requires methods that learn to reason in ways that go beyond base model capabilities in repeated sampling. Since the problems are drawn from subsets of DAPO-Math-17K and DeepScaleR datasets, they remain topically equivalent to standard high-school math. Validating our premise, RL fine-tuned models such as Nemotron-Research-Reasoning-Qwen-1.5B and DeepScaleR-1.5B-Preview perform poorly on MATH-B at pass@1024, showing how existing approaches fall short on tackling harder instances. We hope MATH-B will catalyze exploration-driven RL approaches that elicit deeper reasoning capabilities. We release MATH-B at https://huggingface.co/datasets/brendel-group/MATH-Beyond.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) were shown to struggle with long-term planning, which may be caused by the limited way in which they explore the space of possible solutions. We propose an architecture where a Reinforcement Learning (RL) Agent guides an LLM's space exploration: (1) the Agent has access to domain-specific information, and can therefore make decisions about the quality of candidate solutions based on specific and relevant metrics, which were not explicitly considered by the LLM's training objective; (2) the LLM can focus on generating immediate next steps, without the need for long-term planning. We allow non-linear reasoning by exploring alternative paths and backtracking. We evaluate this architecture on the program equivalence task, and compare it against Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thoughts (ToT). We assess both the downstream task, denoting the binary classification, and the intermediate reasoning steps. Our approach compares positively against CoT and ToT.

Most reasoning benchmarks for LLMs emphasize factual accuracy or step-by-step logic. In finance, however, professionals must not only converge on optimal decisions but also generate creative, plausible futures under uncertainty. We introduce ConDiFi, a benchmark that jointly evaluates divergent and convergent thinking in LLMs for financial tasks. ConDiFi features 607 macro-financial prompts for divergent reasoning and 990 multi-hop adversarial MCQs for convergent reasoning. Using this benchmark, we evaluated 14 leading models and uncovered striking differences. Despite high fluency, GPT-4o underperforms on Novelty and Actionability. In contrast, models like DeepSeek-R1 and Cohere Command R+ rank among the top for generating actionable, insights suitable for investment decisions. ConDiFi provides a new perspective to assess reasoning capabilities essential to safe and strategic deployment of LLMs in finance.

Reasoning large language models (RLLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities through structured and multi-step reasoning. While prior research has primarily focused on improving their training and inference strategies, their potential for in-context learning (ICL) remains largely underexplored. To fill this gap, we propose Thinking with Nothinking Calibration (JointThinking), a new ICL paradigm that leverages the structured difference between two reasoning modes, i.e., Thinking and Nothinking, to improve reasoning accuracy. Specifically, our method prompts the model to generate two answers in parallel: one in Thinking mode and the other in Nothinking mode. A second round of Thinking is triggered only when the two initial responses are inconsistent, using a single prompt that incorporates the original question and both candidate answers. Since such disagreement occurs infrequently (e.g., only 6\% in GSM8K), our method performs just one round of reasoning in most cases, resulting in minimal latency overhead. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that JointThinking significantly outperforms few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) and majority voting with improved answer robustness. Moreover, It achieves comparable in-distribution performance to training-based SOTA method, while substantially outperforming on out-of-distribution tasks. We further conduct a systematic analysis of the calibration mechanism, showing that leveraging different reasoning modes consistently lowers the error rate and highlights the value of structural thinking diversity. Additionally, we observe that the performance gap between actual and ideal reasoning narrows as model size increases in the second round of thinking, indicating the strong scalability of our approach. Finally, we discuss current limitations and outline promising directions for future ICL research in RLLMs.

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.

While chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has revolutionized how LLMs perform reasoning tasks, its current methods and variations (e.g, Self-consistency, ReACT, Reflexion, Tree-of-Thoughts (ToT), Cumulative Reasoning (CR)) suffer from limitations like slowness, limited context grounding, hallucination and inconsistent outputs. To overcome these challenges, we introduce Evidence to Generate (E2G), a novel single-agent, two-step prompting framework. Instead of unverified reasoning claims, this innovative approach leverages the power of "evidence for decision making" by first focusing exclusively on the thought sequences (the series of intermediate steps) explicitly mentioned in the context which then serve as extracted evidence, guiding the LLM's output generation process with greater precision and efficiency. This simple yet powerful approach unlocks the true potential of chain-of-thought like prompting, paving the way for faster, more reliable, and more contextually aware reasoning in LLMs. \tool achieves remarkable results robustly across a wide range of knowledge-intensive reasoning and generation tasks, surpassing baseline approaches with state-of-the-art LLMs. For example, (i) on LogiQA benchmark using GPT-4 as backbone model, \tool achieves a new state-of-the Accuracy of 53.8% exceeding CoT by 18%, ToT by 11%, CR by 9% (ii) a variant of E2G with PaLM2 outperforms the variable-shot performance of Gemini Ultra by 0.9 F1 points, reaching an F1 score of 83.3 on a subset of DROP.

Parallel thinking has emerged as a promising paradigm for reasoning, yet it imposes significant computational burdens. Existing efficiency methods primarily rely on local, per-trajectory signals and lack principled mechanisms to exploit global dynamics across parallel branches. We introduce 2D probing, an interface that exposes the width-depth dynamics of parallel thinking by periodically eliciting intermediate answers from all branches. Our analysis reveals three key insights: non-monotonic scaling across width-depth allocations, heterogeneous reasoning branch lengths, and early stabilization of global consensus. Guided by these insights, we introduce Parallel-Probe, a training-free controller designed to optimize online parallel thinking. Parallel-Probe employs consensus-based early stopping to regulate reasoning depth and deviation-based branch pruning to dynamically adjust width. Extensive experiments across three benchmarks and multiple models demonstrate that Parallel-Probe establishes a superior Pareto frontier for test-time scaling. Compared to standard majority voting, it reduces sequential tokens by up to 35.8% and total token cost by over 25.8% while maintaining competitive accuracy.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled strong chain-of-thought (CoT) generation through test-time computation. While these multi-step reasoning capabilities represent a major milestone in language model performance, they also introduce new safety risks. In this work, we present the first systematic study to revisit the problem of machine unlearning in the context of LRMs. Machine unlearning refers to the process of removing the influence of sensitive, harmful, or undesired data or knowledge from a trained model without full retraining. We show that conventional unlearning algorithms, originally designed for non-reasoning models, are inadequate for LRMs. In particular, even when final answers are successfully erased, sensitive information often persists within the intermediate reasoning steps, i.e., CoT trajectories. To address this challenge, we extend conventional unlearning and propose Reasoning-aware Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (R^2MU), a novel method that effectively suppresses sensitive reasoning traces and prevents the generation of associated final answers, while preserving the model's reasoning ability. Our experiments demonstrate that R^2MU significantly reduces sensitive information leakage within reasoning traces and achieves strong performance across both safety and reasoning benchmarks, evaluated on state-of-the-art models such as DeepSeek-R1-Distill-LLaMA-8B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B.

Reasoning-capable language models achieve state-of-the-art performance in diverse complex tasks by generating long, explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. While recent works show that base models can acquire such reasoning traces via reinforcement learning or distillation from stronger models like DeepSeek-R1, previous works demonstrate that even short CoT prompting without fine-tuning is able to improve reasoning. We ask whether long CoT can be induced in a base model using only prompting or minimal tuning. Using just 20 long CoT examples from the reasoning model QwQ-32B-Preview, we lightly fine-tune the base model Qwen2.5-32B. The resulting model outperforms the much larger Qwen2.5-Math-72B-Instruct, showing that a handful of high-quality examples can unlock strong reasoning capabilities. We further explore using CoT data from non-reasoning models and human annotators, enhanced with prompt engineering, multi-pass editing, and structural guidance. However, neither matches the performance of reasoning model traces, suggesting that certain latent qualities of expert CoT are difficult to replicate. We analyze key properties of reasoning data, such as problem difficulty, diversity, and answer length, that influence reasoning distillation. While challenges remain, we are optimistic that carefully curated human-written CoT, even in small quantities, can activate reasoning behaviors in base models. We release our human-authored dataset across refinement stages and invite further investigation into what makes small-scale reasoning supervision so effective.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have greatly improved their capabilities on complex reasoning tasks through Long Chains of Thought (CoTs). However, this approach often results in substantial redundancy, impairing computational efficiency and causing significant delays in real-time applications. Recent studies show that longer reasoning chains are frequently uncorrelated with correctness and can even be detrimental to accuracy. In a further in-depth analysis of this phenomenon, we surprisingly uncover and empirically verify that LRMs implicitly know the appropriate time to stop thinking, while this capability is obscured by current sampling paradigms. Motivated by this, we introduce SAGE (Self-Aware Guided Efficient Reasoning), a novel sampling paradigm that unleashes this efficient reasoning potential. Furthermore, integrating SAGE as mixed sampling into group-based reinforcement learning (SAGE-RL) enables SAGE-RL to effectively incorporate SAGE-discovered efficient reasoning patterns into standard pass@1 inference, markedly enhancing both the reasoning accuracy and efficiency of LRMs across multiple challenging mathematical benchmarks.

We envision a new era of AI, termed agentic organization, where agents solve complex problems by working collaboratively and concurrently, enabling outcomes beyond individual intelligence. To realize this vision, we introduce asynchronous thinking (AsyncThink) as a new paradigm of reasoning with large language models, which organizes the internal thinking process into concurrently executable structures. Specifically, we propose a thinking protocol where an organizer dynamically assigns sub-queries to workers, merges intermediate knowledge, and produces coherent solutions. More importantly, the thinking structure in this protocol can be further optimized through reinforcement learning. Experiments demonstrate that AsyncThink achieves 28% lower inference latency compared to parallel thinking while improving accuracy on mathematical reasoning. Moreover, AsyncThink generalizes its learned asynchronous thinking capabilities, effectively tackling unseen tasks without additional training.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have leveraged explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting to improve reasoning accuracy. However, most existing methods primarily compress verbose reasoning outputs. These Long-to-Short transformations aim to improve efficiency, but still rely on explicit reasoning during inference. In this work, we introduce 3TF (Thought-Training and Thought-Free inference), a framework for efficient reasoning that takes a Short-to-Long perspective. We first train a hybrid model that can operate in both reasoning and non-reasoning modes, and then further train it on CoT-annotated data to internalize structured reasoning, while enforcing concise, thought-free outputs at inference time using the no-reasoning mode. Unlike compression-based approaches, 3TF improves the reasoning quality of non-reasoning outputs, enabling models to perform rich internal reasoning implicitly while keeping external outputs short. Empirically, 3TF-trained models obtain large improvements on reasoning benchmarks under thought-free inference, demonstrating that high quality reasoning can be learned and executed implicitly without explicit step-by-step generation.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve high performance on standard mathematical benchmarks, their underlying reasoning processes remain highly overfit to standard textual formatting. We propose a perturbation pipeline consisting of 14 techniques to evaluate robustness of LLM reasoning. We apply this pipeline to AIME 2024 dataset and evalute 8 state-of-the-art models on the resulting benchmark. While frontier models exhibit resilience, open weights reasoning models suffer catastrophic collapses (up to 55% average accuracy drops across perturbations and up to 100% on some), exposing structural fragility. To further disentangle mechanical parsing failures from downstream reasoning failures, we strictly isolate the models' working memory capacity by forcing models to solve multiple unperturbed mathematical problems sequentially within a single context window. Our results indicate that open weight models ranging from 7B to 120B parameters and Claude Opus 4.6 exhibit accuracy decay on subsequent problems. This degradation demonstrates that intermediate reasoning steps permanently pollute standard dense attention mechanisms. We argue that to achieve reliable reasoning, future reasoning architectures must integrate explicit contextual resets within a model's own Chain-of-Thought, leading to fundamental open questions regarding the optimal granularity of atomic reasoning tasks.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

While 4-bit quantization has emerged as a memory-optimal choice for non-reasoning models and zero-shot tasks across scales, we show that this universal prescription fails for reasoning models, where the KV cache rather than model size can dominate memory. Through systematic experiments across 1,700 inference scenarios on AIME25 and GPQA-Diamond, we find a scale-dependent trade-off: models with an effective size below 8-bit 4B parameters achieve better accuracy by allocating memory to more weights rather than longer generation, while larger models achieve better accuracy by allocating memory to longer generations. This scale threshold also determines when parallel scaling becomes memory-efficient and whether KV cache eviction outperforms KV quantization. Our findings show that memory optimization for LLMs cannot be scale-agnostic, while providing principled guidelines: for small reasoning models, prioritize model capacity over test-time compute, while for larger ones, maximize test-time compute. Our results suggest that optimizing reasoning models for deployment requires fundamentally different strategies from those established for non-reasoning models.

Tool-integrated reasoning (TIR) offers a direct way to extend thinking models beyond the limits of text-only reasoning. Paradoxically, we observe that tool-enabled evaluation can degrade reasoning performance even when the strong thinking models make almost no actual tool calls. In this paper, we investigate how to inject natural tool-use behavior into a strong thinking model without sacrificing its no-tool reasoning ability, and present a comprehensive TIR recipe. We highlight that (i) the effectiveness of TIR supervised fine-tuning (SFT) hinges on the learnability of teacher trajectories, which should prioritize problems inherently suited for tool-augmented solutions; (ii) controlling the proportion of tool-use trajectories could mitigate the catastrophic forgetting of text-only reasoning capacity; (iii) optimizing for pass@k and response length instead of training loss could maximize TIR SFT gains while preserving headroom for reinforcement learning (RL) exploration; (iv) a stable RL with verifiable rewards (RLVR) stage, built upon suitable SFT initialization and explicit safeguards against mode collapse, provides a simple yet remarkably effective solution. When applied to Qwen3 thinking models at 4B and 30B scales, our recipe yields models that achieve state-of-the-art performance in a wide range of benchmarks among open-source models, such as 96.7% and 99.2% on AIME 2025 for 4B and 30B, respectively.

Recent advances in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting have substantially improved the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, these methods often suffer from overthinking, leading to unnecessarily lengthy or redundant reasoning traces. Existing approaches attempt to mitigate this issue through curating multiple reasoning chains for training LLMs, but their effectiveness is often constrained by the quality of the generated data and prone to overfitting. To address the challenge, we propose Reasoning Compression ThroUgh Stepwise Trials (ReCUT), a novel method aimed at balancing the accuracy and length of reasoning trajectory. Specifically, ReCUT employs a stepwise exploration mechanism and a long-short switched sampling strategy, enabling LLMs to incrementally generate diverse reasoning paths. These paths are evaluated and used to construct preference pairs to train two specialized models (Gemini LLMs)-one optimized for reasoning accuracy, the other for shorter reasoning. A final integrated model is obtained by interpolating the parameters of these two models. Experimental results across multiple math reasoning datasets and backbone models demonstrate that ReCUT significantly reduces reasoning lengths by approximately 30-50%, while maintaining or improving reasoning accuracy compared to various baselines. All codes and data will be released via https://github.com/NEUIR/ReCUT.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

LLMs can perform multi-step reasoning through Chain-of-Thought (CoT), but they cannot reliably verify their own logic. Even when they reach correct answers, the underlying reasoning may be flawed, undermining trust in high-stakes scenarios. To mitigate this issue, we introduce VeriCoT, a neuro-symbolic method that extracts and verifies formal logical arguments from CoT reasoning. VeriCoT formalizes each CoT reasoning step into first-order logic and identifies premises that ground the argument in source context, commonsense knowledge, or prior reasoning steps. The symbolic representation enables automated solvers to verify logical validity while the NL premises allow humans and systems to identify ungrounded or fallacious reasoning steps. Experiments on the ProofWriter, LegalBench, and BioASQ datasets show VeriCoT effectively identifies flawed reasoning, and serves as a strong predictor of final answer correctness. We also leverage VeriCoT's verification signal for (1) inference-time self-reflection, (2) supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on VeriCoT-distilled datasets and (3) preference fine-tuning (PFT) with direct preference optimization (DPO) using verification-based pairwise rewards, further improving reasoning validity and accuracy.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Recent work has demonstrated that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) often yields limited gains for soft-reasoning problems such as analytical and commonsense reasoning. CoT can also be unfaithful to a model's actual reasoning. We investigate the dynamics and faithfulness of CoT in soft-reasoning tasks across instruction-tuned, reasoning and reasoning-distilled models. Our findings reveal differences in how these models rely on CoT, and show that CoT influence and faithfulness are not always aligned.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) embed private or copyrighted information not only in their final answers but also throughout multi-step chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, making reliable unlearning far more demanding than in standard LLMs. We introduce Reasoning-TOFU (R-TOFU), the first benchmark tailored to this setting. R-TOFU augments existing unlearning tasks with realistic CoT annotations and provides step-wise metrics that expose residual knowledge invisible to answer-level checks. Using R-TOFU, we carry out a comprehensive comparison of gradient-based and preference-optimization baselines and show that conventional answer-only objectives leave substantial forget traces in reasoning. We further propose Reasoned IDK, a preference-optimization variant that preserves coherent yet inconclusive reasoning, achieving a stronger balance between forgetting efficacy and model utility than earlier refusal styles. Finally, we identify a failure mode: decoding variants such as ZeroThink and LessThink can still reveal forgotten content despite seemingly successful unlearning, emphasizing the need to evaluate models under diverse decoding settings. Together, the benchmark, analysis, and new baseline establish a systematic foundation for studying and improving unlearning in LRMs while preserving their reasoning capabilities.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to improve Large Language Model (LLM) performance on various tasks. With this approach, LLMs appear to produce human-like reasoning steps before providing answers (a.k.a., CoT reasoning), which often leads to the perception that they engage in deliberate inferential processes. However, some initial findings suggest that CoT reasoning may be more superficial than it appears, motivating us to explore further. In this paper, we study CoT reasoning via a data distribution lens and investigate if CoT reasoning reflects a structured inductive bias learned from in-distribution data, allowing the model to conditionally generate reasoning paths that approximate those seen during training. Thus, its effectiveness is fundamentally bounded by the degree of distribution discrepancy between the training data and the test queries. With this lens, we dissect CoT reasoning via three dimensions: task, length, and format. To investigate each dimension, we design DataAlchemy, an isolated and controlled environment to train LLMs from scratch and systematically probe them under various distribution conditions. Our results reveal that CoT reasoning is a brittle mirage that vanishes when it is pushed beyond training distributions. This work offers a deeper understanding of why and when CoT reasoning fails, emphasizing the ongoing challenge of achieving genuine and generalizable reasoning.