Daily Papers

The increasing depth of parametric domain knowledge in large language models (LLMs) is fueling their rapid deployment in real-world applications. Understanding model vulnerabilities in high-stakes and knowledge-intensive tasks is essential for quantifying the trustworthiness of model predictions and regulating their use. The recent discovery of named entities as adversarial examples (i.e. adversarial entities) in natural language processing tasks raises questions about their potential impact on the knowledge robustness of pre-trained and finetuned LLMs in high-stakes and specialized domains. We examined the use of type-consistent entity substitution as a template for collecting adversarial entities for billion-parameter LLMs with biomedical knowledge. To this end, we developed an embedding-space attack based on powerscaled distance-weighted sampling to assess the robustness of their biomedical knowledge with a low query budget and controllable coverage. Our method has favorable query efficiency and scaling over alternative approaches based on random sampling and blackbox gradient-guided search, which we demonstrated for adversarial distractor generation in biomedical question answering. Subsequent failure mode analysis uncovered two regimes of adversarial entities on the attack surface with distinct characteristics and we showed that entity substitution attacks can manipulate token-wise Shapley value explanations, which become deceptive in this setting. Our approach complements standard evaluations for high-capacity models and the results highlight the brittleness of domain knowledge in LLMs.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

With local differential privacy (LDP), users can privatize their data and thus guarantee privacy properties before transmitting it to the server (a.k.a. the aggregator). One primary objective of LDP is frequency (or histogram) estimation, in which the aggregator estimates the number of users for each possible value. In practice, when a study with rich content on a population is desired, the interest is in the multiple attributes of the population, that is to say, in multidimensional data (d geq 2). However, contrary to the problem of frequency estimation of a single attribute (the majority of the works), the multidimensional aspect imposes to pay particular attention to the privacy budget. This one can indeed grow extremely quickly due to the composition theorem. To the authors' knowledge, two solutions seem to stand out for this task: 1) splitting the privacy budget for each attribute, i.e., send each value with fracε{d}-LDP (Spl), and 2) random sampling a single attribute and spend all the privacy budget to send it with ε-LDP (Smp). Although Smp adds additional sampling error, it has proven to provide higher data utility than the former Spl solution. However, we argue that aggregators (who are also seen as attackers) are aware of the sampled attribute and its LDP value, which is protected by a "less strict" e^ε probability bound (rather than e^{ε/d}). This way, we propose a solution named Random Sampling plus Fake Data (RS+FD), which allows creating uncertainty over the sampled attribute by generating fake data for each non-sampled attribute; RS+FD further benefits from amplification by sampling. We theoretically and experimentally validate our proposed solution on both synthetic and real-world datasets to show that RS+FD achieves nearly the same or better utility than the state-of-the-art Smp solution.